

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

	X	
THOMAS S. SWANSON, Individually and on	:	Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-05518-BMC-RER
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,	:	
	:	<u>CLASS ACTION</u>
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
vs.	:	OF LEAD PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
	:	FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
INTERFACE, INC., DANIEL T. HENDRIX,	:	SETTLEMENT AND APPROVAL OF PLAN
JAY D. GOULD, BRUCE A. HAUSMANN	:	OF ALLOCATION
and PATRICK C. LYNCH,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	
	X	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.....	3
III. STANDARDS FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS.....	4
A. The Law Favors and Encourages Settlements	4
B. The Settlement Must Be Procedurally and Substantively Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable	4
C. The Proposed Settlement Is Procedurally and Substantively Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable	7
1. The Settlement Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(e)(2).....	7
2. The Settlement Satisfies the Remaining <i>Grinnell</i> Factors.....	16
IV. THE PLAN OF ALLOCATION IS FAIR AND ADEQUATE	20
V. THE COURT SHOULD FINALLY CERTIFY THE SETTLEMENT CLASS FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTUATING THE SETTLEMENT.....	21
VI. NOTICE TO THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23 AND DUE PROCESS.....	22
VII. CONCLUSION.....	24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page
 CASES	
<i>Castagna v. Madison Square Garden, L.P.</i> , 2011 WL 2208614 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2011)	18
<i>Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. NY LLC</i> , 874 F. Supp. 2d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), <i>aff'd sub nom. Charron v. Wiener</i> , 731 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2013).....	9
<i>Christine Asia Co., Ltd. v. Yun Ma</i> , 2019 WL 5257534 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2019).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>City of Providence v. Aeropostale, Inc.</i> , 2014 WL 1883494 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2014), <i>aff'd sub nom. Arbuthnot v. Pierson</i> , 607 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2015)	16, 18
<i>Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.</i> , 502 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2007).....	7
<i>D'Amato v. Deutsche Bank</i> , 236 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001).....	6, 8
<i>Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.</i> , 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Dornberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.</i> , 203 F.R.D. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)	24
<i>Hicks v. Stanley</i> , 2005 WL 2757792 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005).....	12
<i>In re Advanced Battery Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig.</i> , 298 F.R.D. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)	4, 9, 12, 20
<i>In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.</i> , 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), <i>aff'd</i> , 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).....	18
<i>In re AOL Time Warner, Inc.</i> , 2006 WL 903236 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006).....	10

	Page
<i>In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. SEC. Derivative, & ERISA Litig.</i> , 909 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).....	16, 19
<i>In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep Ecodiesel Mktg., Sales Prac. & Prods. Liab. Litig.</i> , 2019 WL 2554232 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2019).....	6
<i>In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig.</i> , 343 F. Supp. 3d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), <i>aff'd sub nom. In re Facebook Inc.</i> , 822 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2020)	<i>passim</i>
<i>In re FLAG Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig.</i> , 2010 WL 4537550 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010).....	9
<i>In re Glob. Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig.</i> , 225 F.R.D. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)	6, 9, 17, 19
<i>In re Hi-Crush Partners L.P. Sec. Litig.</i> , 2014 WL 7323417 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2014)	17
<i>In re IMAX Sec. Litig.</i> , 283 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)	11, 20
<i>In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Rsch. Sec. Litig.</i> , 249 F.R.D. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)	22
<i>In re PaineWebber Ltd. P'ships Litig.</i> , 171 F.R.D. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), <i>aff'd</i> , 117 F.3d 721 (2d Cir. 1997).....	20
<i>In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig.</i> , 330 F.R.D. 11 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).....	5, 6
<i>In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig.</i> , 2020 WL 4196468 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2020)	7, 8, 9, 20
<i>In re Sony SXRDRear Projection Television Class Action Litig.</i> , 2008 WL 1956267 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2008)	18
<i>In re Telik, Inc. Sec. Litig.</i> , 576 F. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).....	11
<i>In re Veeco Instruments Inc. Sec. Litig.</i> , 2007 WL 4115809 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007).....	16

	Page
<i>Martignago v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.</i> , 2013 WL 12316358 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2013).....	16
<i>McMahon v. Olivier Cheng Catering & Events, LLC</i> , 2010 WL 2399328 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010).....	4, 8, 9, 18
<i>Mikhlin v. Oasmia Pharm. AB.</i> , 2021 WL 1259559 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2021).....	11, 13
<i>Newman v. Stein</i> , 464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972).....	19
<i>Nichols v. Noom, Inc.</i> , 2022 WL 2705354 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2022).....	14
<i>Padro v. Astrue</i> , 2013 WL 5719076 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2013).....	23
<i>Pelzer v. Vassalle</i> , 655 F. App'x 352 (6th Cir. 2016).....	14
<i>Rodriguez v. CPI Aerostructures, Inc.</i> , 2023 WL 2184496 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2023).....	5, 9, 23
<i>Snyder v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC</i> , 2019 WL 2103379 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2019).....	6
<i>Strougo v. Bassini</i> , 258 F. Supp. 2d 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).....	12
<i>Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.</i> , 216 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).....	5
<i>Vargas v. Cap. One Fin. Advisors</i> , 559 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2014).....	22
<i>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc.</i> , 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Waterford Twp. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Smithtown Bancorp, Inc.</i> , 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73276 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2015).....	8
<i>Yuzary v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.</i> , 2013 WL 5492998 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2013).....	6, 16

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

15 U.S.C.

 §78j(b).....10

 §78u-4 *passim*

 §78u-4(a)(4)1, 14

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

 Rule 23(a).....21

 Rule 23(b)(3).....21

 Rule 23(c).....18

 Rule 23(c)(2)(B).....22, 23

 Rule 23(e)..... *passim*

 Rule 23(e)(1)(B).....22

 Rule 23(e)(2)..... *passim*

 Rule 23(e)(2)(A)7

 Rule 23(e)(2)(B).....8

 Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(i).....9, 13

 Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(ii).....13

 Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iii).....14

 Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iv).....14

 Rule 23(e)(2)(D)15

 Rule 23(e)(3).....5, 14

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES

Laarni T. Bulan & Laura E. Simmons,
Securities Class Action Settlements: 2022 Review and Analysis
 (Cornerstone Research 2023).....19

Pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Lead Plaintiff Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Fund, on behalf of itself and the Settlement Class, respectfully submits this memorandum of law in support of its motion for final approval of the \$7,500,000 Settlement (the “Settlement Amount”) reached in this action (the “Action”) and approval of the Plan of Allocation (the “Plan”). The terms of the Settlement are set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement dated May 17, 2023 (the “Stipulation”). ECF 77.¹

I. INTRODUCTION

Lead Plaintiff’s \$7.5 million recovery is the result of its rigorous nearly three-year effort to prosecute this highly contested litigation, reached following lengthy arm’s-length settlement negotiations by experienced and knowledgeable counsel, overseen by a nationally renowned mediator. The Settlement represents a very good result for the Settlement Class under the circumstances and easily satisfies each of the Rule 23(e)(2) factors, as well as the factors set forth in the Second Circuit decision of *Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).

The Settlement is especially beneficial to the Settlement Class in light of the substantial litigation risks Lead Plaintiff faced. The gravamen of Lead Plaintiff’s claims was that, during the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and misleading statements and/or omitted material information by utilizing improper and fictitious manual adjustments to Interface’s accounting entries, which caused Interface’s income and earnings per share (EPS) figures to be materially misstated and not stated in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) at

¹ All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings set forth in the Stipulation and the Declaration of David A. Rosenfeld in Support of: (1) Lead Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Approval of Plan of Allocation; and (2) Lead Counsel’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses and an Award to Lead Plaintiff Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4) (“Rosenfeld Decl.”), submitted herewith. Citations are omitted and emphasis is added throughout unless otherwise noted.

all relevant times. Rosenfeld Decl., ¶21. Lead Plaintiff alleges that as a result of these accounting manipulations, the price of Interface common stock traded at artificially inflated prices. The SEC began an investigation into the Company's EPS reporting in November 2017 and served subpoenas in February 2018, July 2018, and April 2018. Interface failed to disclose the investigation until the third subpoena when the SEC requested Interface conduct an internal investigation on its EPS reporting. *See* Amended Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws (ECF 30), ¶¶95-96. On April 24, 2019, Interface disclosed to the SEC that then corporate-controller Bauer went on paid leave after the Company learned he added notes to materials produced to the SEC. *Id.*, ¶97. Interface's stock dropped by \$1.43 per share, or 8.37%, to close at \$15.66 per share on April 25, 2019. *Id.*, ¶98. The SEC issued an Order dated September 28, 2020 (the "SEC Order") finding that Interface had violated multiple federal securities laws. *Id.*, ¶100. The SEC Order also found that Bauer and Defendant Lynch violated certain sections of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act. *Id.*, ¶¶101-102. The SEC also found that Interface deliberately interfered with its investigation by producing documents that were previously non-existent, and modifying other documents that were produced. *Id.*, ¶103. When the SEC Order was disclosed, Interface stock declined \$0.20 per share, or 3.13%, over the following two trading sessions, closing at \$6.18 per share on September 29, 2020, causing Settlement Class Members to suffer significant financial losses and damages. While Lead Plaintiff believes in the merits of its claims, Defendants had strong arguments that Lead Plaintiff could not establish the elements of falsity, materiality, scienter, and loss causation. Rosenfeld Decl., ¶¶26-27. Defendants also maintained that to the extent the Settlement Class suffered any damages (which Defendants vehemently denied), Defendants argued that they were far lower than the amount calculated by Lead Plaintiff's expert.

Given the stage of the litigation, Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel had a thorough understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the case before reaching the Settlement, as they had conducted a significant factual investigation into the merits of the claims, engaged in briefing in connection with Defendants' motion to dismiss, conducted merits document discovery and expert consultation, moved for class certification, and participated in formal mediation discussions with Jed Melnick, an experienced mediator. Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel also knew that despite their belief in the merits of the claims, there existed the possibility of little or no recovery at all. Moreover, a skilled and highly reputable securities litigation mediator assisted the parties in reaching a resolution of the case for \$7.5 million.

Given the risks to proceeding and the recovery obtained, Lead Plaintiff respectfully submits that the \$7.5 million Settlement and the Plan – which was prepared with the assistance of Lead Counsel's in-house damages expert, and is substantially similar to numerous other such plans that have been approved in this Circuit – are fair and reasonable in all respects. Accordingly, Lead Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval of the Settlement under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

To avoid repetition, Lead Plaintiff respectfully refers the Court to the accompanying Rosenfeld Decl. for a detailed discussion of the factual background and procedural history of the Action, the extensive efforts undertaken by Lead Plaintiff and its counsel during the course of the Action, the risks of continued litigation, and the negotiations leading to the Settlement.

III. STANDARDS FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS

A. The Law Favors and Encourages Settlements

“Courts examine procedural and substantive fairness in light of the ‘strong judicial policy favoring settlements’ of class action suits.”² *McMahon v. Olivier Cheng Catering & Events, LLC*, 2010 WL 2399328, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010) (citing *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc.*, 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also *In re Advanced Battery Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 298 F.R.D. 171, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other complex cases where substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the time, cost, and rigor of prolonged litigation.”). Thus, the Second Circuit has instructed that, while a court should not give “rubber stamp approval” to a proposed settlement, it should “stop short of the detailed and thorough investigation that it would undertake if it were actually trying the case.” *Grinnell*, 495 F.2d at 462.

As set forth below, the \$7.5 million Settlement here, particularly in light of the significant litigation risks Lead Plaintiff faced, is manifestly reasonable, fair, and adequate under all of the pertinent factors courts use to evaluate a settlement. Accordingly, the Settlement warrants final approval from this Court.

B. The Settlement Must Be Procedurally and Substantively Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires judicial approval of a class action settlement. Rule 23(e)(2) provides that courts should consider certain factors when determining whether a class action settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” such that final approval is warranted:

- (A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class;
- (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length;

² Unless otherwise noted, internal citations are omitted and emphasis is added.

- (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:
 - (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;
 - (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims;
 - (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and
 - (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and
- (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).

In addition, the Second Circuit considers the following factors (the “*Grinnell* Factors”), which overlap with the Rule 23(e)(2) factors, when determining whether to approve a class action settlement:

the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.

Grinnell, 495 F.2d at 463; *see also In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig.*, 330 F.R.D. 11, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (explaining that “the [new] Rule 23(e) factors . . . add to, rather than displace, the *Grinnell* [F]actors,” and “there is significant overlap” between the two “as they both guide a court’s substantive, as opposed to procedural, analysis”); *Rodriguez v. CPI Aerostructures, Inc.*, 2023 WL 2184496, at *28 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2023) (same).

For a settlement to be deemed substantively and procedurally fair, reasonable, and adequate, not every factor need be satisfied. “[R]ather, the court should consider the totality of these factors in light of the particular circumstances.” *Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 216 F.R.D. 55, 61

(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing *D'Amato v. Deutsche Bank*, 236 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001)). Additionally, “[a]bsent fraud or collusion, [courts] should be hesitant to substitute [their] judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement.” *Yuzary v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.*, 2013 WL 5492998, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2013) (second and third alterations in original); *see also In re Glob. Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig.*, 225 F.R.D. 436, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (courts should not substitute their “business judgment for that of counsel, absent evidence of fraud or overreaching”).

Under Rule 23(e)(2), courts “must assess at the preliminary approval stage whether the parties have shown that the court will likely find that the [Rule 23(e)(2)] factors weigh in favor of final settlement approval.” *Payment Card Interchange*, 330 F.R.D. at 28. As set forth in Lead Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement, Certification of the Class, and Approval of Notice to the Class (ECF 76), and acknowledged by the Preliminary Approval Order (ECF 80), Lead Plaintiff meets all of the requirements imposed by Rule 23(e)(2). Courts have noted that a plaintiff’s satisfaction of these factors is virtually assured where, as here, little has changed between preliminary approval and final approval. *See In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep Ecodiesel Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 2019 WL 2554232, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2019) (finding that the “conclusions [made in granting preliminary approval] stand and counsel equally in favor of final approval now”); *Snyder v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC*, 2019 WL 2103379, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2019) (noting in analyzing Rule 23(e)(2) that “[s]ignificant portions of the Court’s analysis remain materially unchanged from the previous order [granting preliminary approval]”).

C. The Proposed Settlement Is Procedurally and Substantively Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable

1. The Settlement Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(e)(2)

a. Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel Have Adequately Represented the Settlement Class

The determination of adequacy “typically ‘entails inquiry as to whether: 1) [P]laintiff[s]’ interests are antagonistic to the interest[s] of other members of the class and 2) [P]laintiff[s]’ attorneys are qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation.” *Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.*, 502 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2007). Here, Lead Plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to, and in fact are directly aligned with, the interests of other Members of the Settlement Class. Lead Plaintiff has “claims that are typical of and coextensive with those of other [Settlement] Class Members and has no interests antagonistic to those of other [Settlement] Class Members. [Lead Plaintiff has] an interest in obtaining the largest possible recovery from Defendants.” *In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig.*, 2020 WL 4196468, at *2 (S.D.N.Y July 21, 2020). Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel have adequately represented the Settlement Class by zealously prosecuting this Action, including by, among other things, conducting an extensive investigation of the relevant factual events, drafting a highly detailed amended complaint, opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, moving for class certification, conducting merits discovery, and retaining experts, and preparing for and participating in mediation sessions before Mr. Melnick, followed by lengthy settlement negotiations. *See generally* Rosenfeld Decl. Through each step of the Action, Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel have strenuously advocated for the best interests of the Settlement Class. Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel therefore satisfy Rule 23(e)(2)(A) for purposes of final approval.

b. The Proposed Settlement Was Negotiated by Experienced Counsel at Arm’s Length Before an Experienced Mediator

Lead Plaintiff satisfies Rule 23(e)(2)(B) because the Settlement is the product of arm’s-length negotiations between the parties’ counsel before a neutral mediator, with no hint of collusion. Rosenfeld Decl., ¶¶40-42. Notably, the case did not settle immediately following either mediation session and required additional negotiations through Mr. Melnick. Indeed, the use of the mediation process provides compelling evidence that the Settlement is not the result of collusion. *See In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig.*, 343 F. Supp. 3d 394, 408-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (settlement was procedurally fair where it was “based on the suggestion by a neutral mediator”), *aff’d sub nom. In re Facebook Inc.*, 822 F. App’x 40 (2d Cir. 2020); *McMahon*, 2010 WL 2399328, at *4 (“Arm’s-length negotiations involving counsel and a mediator raise a presumption that the settlement they achieved meets the requirements of due process.”) (citing *Wal-Mart Stores*, 396 F.3d at 116); *D’Amato*, 236 F.3d at 85 (a “mediator’s involvement in . . . settlement negotiations helps to ensure that the proceedings were free of collusion and undue pressure”); *Waterford Twp. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Smithtown Bancorp, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73276, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2015) (“The assistance of an experienced mediator, Jed Melnick, Esq. of JAMS, reinforces that the Settlement is non-collusive.”). Moreover, the Settlement negotiations in this case were “carried out under the direction of [Lead Plaintiff], . . . whose involvement suggests procedural fairness.” *Facebook*, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 409. “A settlement reached under the supervision and with the endorsement of a sophisticated institutional investor . . . is entitled to an even greater presumption of reasonableness.” *Signet*, 2020 WL 4196468, at *4 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (ellipsis in original).

It is well-settled in this Circuit that “a class action settlement enjoys a strong ‘presumption of fairness’ where it is the product of arm’s-length negotiations concluded by experienced, capable counsel.” *Advanced Battery*, 298 F.R.D. at 175 (citing *Wal-Mart Stores*, 396 F.3d at 116); *see also Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. NY LLC*, 874 F. Supp. 2d 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Recommendations of experienced counsel are entitled to great weight in evaluating a proposed settlement in a class action because such counsel are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation.”), *aff’d sub nom. Charron v. Wiener*, 731 F.3d 241 (2d. Cir. 2013); *McMahon*, 2010 WL 2399328, at *4 (settlement was “procedurally fair, reasonable, adequate, and not a product of collusion” where it was reached after “arm’s-length negotiations between the parties”). Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the Court granting final approval of the Settlement.

c. The Proposed Settlement Is Adequate in Light of the Litigation Risks, Costs, and Delays of Trial and Appeal

Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(i) and the first, fourth and fifth *Grinnell* Factors overlap, as they address the substantive fairness of the Settlement in light of the risks posed by continuing litigation. *Rodriguez*, 2023 WL 2184496, at *29. As set forth below, these factors weigh in favor of final approval.

(1) The Risks of Establishing Liability at Trial

In considering this factor, “the Court need only assess the risks of litigation against the certainty of recovery under the proposed settlement.” *Glob. Crossing*, 225 F.R.D. at 459. As a preliminary matter, the significant unpredictability and complexity posed by securities class actions generally weigh in favor of final approval. Indeed, “[i]n evaluating the settlement of a securities class action, federal courts, . . . have long recognized that such litigation is notably difficult and notoriously uncertain.” *Signet*, 2020 WL 4196468, at *4 (internal quotations and citations omitted); *Christine Asia Co., Ltd. v. Yun Ma*, 2019 WL 5257534, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2019); *see also In re FLAG Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig.*, 2010 WL 4537550, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010)

(same); *In re AOL Time Warner, Inc.*, 2006 WL 903236, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006) (“The difficulty of establishing liability is a common risk of securities litigation.”). Although Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel firmly believe that the claims asserted in the Action are meritorious, and that they would prevail at trial, further litigation against the Defendants posed risks that made any recovery uncertain.

As set forth above and in the Rosenfeld Decl., at the time of the Settlement, the parties were engaged in full scale merits discovery, and expert discovery was on the horizon. Defendants have vigorously contested their liability and have denied and continue to deny each and every claim and allegation of wrongdoing. Specifically, Defendants have argued that none of their alleged misstatements or omissions concerning the Company’s financial results were materially false or misleading or made with scienter. Rosenfeld Decl., ¶¶48-52. For example, Defendants argued that the alleged accounting errors were estimates that are matters of opinion, and that, in any event, the misrepresented financial results amounted to less than 1% of the Company’s assets during the reporting periods in question, *id.* at ¶49, and therefore were immaterial. *Id.* With respect to scienter, Defendants maintained that Lead Plaintiff had not presented any actionable motive to commit fraud, and the SEC’s negligence findings against the Company could not support a scienter finding under §10(b). *Id.*, ¶51. In light of the difficulty of pleading falsity, materiality, scienter, and loss causation in securities fraud class actions under the high bar of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), Lead Plaintiff knew it faced a substantial risk that the Court would grant Defendants’ likely motion for summary judgment, leaving Lead Plaintiff and the Settlement Class with no recovery at all.

(2) The Risks of Establishing Loss Causation and Damages at Trial

The risks of establishing liability apply with equal force to establishing loss causation and damages. Here, Defendants argued that Lead Plaintiff had not adequately alleged (and could not prove) loss causation for either of the purported corrective disclosures. Defendants argued that the disclosures of the SEC investigation in April 2019 and SEC settlement in September 2020 revealed only the SEC's investigations and allegations and nothing more. ECF 42 at 2. Defendants argued that these disclosures were at most a negative characterization of accounting charges previously disclosed in 2015 and 2016. *Id.* They maintained that because Interface's stock price rose on the date of the ultimate disclosure, no loss causation existed. *Id.* See also Rosenfeld Decl., ¶53.

Had litigation continued, Lead Plaintiff would have relied heavily on expert testimony to establish loss causation and damages, likely leading to a battle of the experts at trial and *Daubert* challenges. As courts have long recognized, the substantial uncertainty as to which side's experts' views might be credited by a jury presents a serious litigation risk. See *Mikhlin v. Oasmia Pharm. AB.*, 2021 WL 1259559, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2021) (“Both parties would present expert testimony on the issue of damages, which makes it ‘virtually impossible to predict’ which side’s testimony would be found more credible, as well as ‘which damages would be found to have been caused by actionable, rather than the myriad nonactionable factors such as general market conditions.’”); *In re IMAX Sec. Litig.*, 283 F.R.D. 178, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[I]t is well established that damages calculations in securities class actions often descend into a battle of experts.”); *In re Telik, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 576 F. Supp. 2d 570, 579-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[i]n this ‘battle of experts,’ it is virtually impossible to predict with any certainty which testimony would be credited, and ultimately, which damages would be found”). If the Court determined that one or more of Lead Plaintiff's experts

should be excluded from testifying at trial, Lead Plaintiff's case would become much more difficult to prove.

Thus, in light of the very significant risks Lead Plaintiff faced at the time of the Settlement with regard to establishing liability and damages, this factor weighs heavily in favor of final approval.

(3) The Settlement Eliminates the Additional Costs and Delay of Continued Litigation

The anticipated complexity, cost, and duration of continued litigation would be considerable. *See Advanced Battery*, 298 F.R.D. at 175 (“the complexity, expense, and likely duration of litigation are critical factors in evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement”). Indeed, if not for the Settlement, the Action, which has already been pending for almost three years, would have continued through the completion of fact and expert discovery. The subsequent motion for summary judgment, as well as the preparation for what would likely be a multi-week trial, would have caused the action to persist for several more years before the class could possibly receive any recovery. Such a lengthy and highly uncertain process would not serve the best interests of the Settlement Class compared to the immediate, certain monetary benefits of the Settlement. *See Strougo v. Bassini*, 258 F. Supp. 2d 254, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“even if a shareholder or class member was willing to assume all the risks of pursuing the actions through further litigation . . . the passage of time would introduce yet more risks . . . and would, in light of the time value of money, make future recoveries less valuable than this current recovery”); *Hicks v. Stanley*, 2005 WL 2757792, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005) (“Further litigation would necessarily involve further costs [and] justice may be best served with a fair settlement today as opposed to an uncertain future settlement or trial of the action.”).

Accordingly, the Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(i) factor, as well as the first, fourth and fifth *Grinnell* Factors, all weigh in favor of final approval.

d. The Proposed Method for Distributing Relief Is Effective

With respect to Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(ii), Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel have taken appropriate steps to ensure that the Settlement Class is notified about the Settlement. Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, over 30,700 copies of the Notice and Proof of Claim and Release form (“Claim Form”) were mailed to potential Settlement Class Members and nominees, and the Summary Notice was published in *The Wall Street Journal* and transmitted over *Business Wire*. See Declaration of Ross D. Murray Regarding Notice Dissemination, Publication, and Requests for Exclusion Received to Date (“Murray Decl.”), ¶¶5-12, submitted herewith. Additionally, a settlement-specific website was created where key Settlement documents were posted, including the Stipulation, Notice, Claim Form, and Preliminary Approval Order. *Id.*, ¶14. Settlement Class Members have until August 28, 2023 to object to the Settlement and to request exclusion from the Settlement Class. While the objection and exclusion date has not yet passed, there are no objections to the adequacy of the Settlement, and no requests for exclusion from the Settlement Class have been received. *Id.*, ¶16.

Settlement Class Members have until September 13, 2023 to submit Claim Forms. The claims process is similar to that typically used in securities class action settlements. See *Christine Asia*, 2019 WL 5257534, at *14 (“[t]his type of claims processing and method for distributing settlement proceeds is standard in securities and other class actions and is effective”). This claims process will “deter or defeat unjustified claims’ without imposing an undue demand on class members.” *Mikhlin*, 2021 WL 1259559, at *6. This factor therefore supports final approval.

e. Lead Counsel’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees Is Reasonable

Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iii) addresses “the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii). Consistent with the Notice, and as discussed in Lead Counsel’s accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support of Lead Counsel’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses and an Award to Lead Plaintiff Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4) (“Fee Memorandum”), counsel for Lead Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of 33% of the Settlement Amount, and expenses in the amount of \$116,594.97, in addition to interest on both amounts, to be paid at the time of award.³

As set forth in the accompanying Fee Memorandum, this request is in line with recent fee awards in this Circuit in similar common-fund cases. *Nichols v. Noom, Inc.*, 2022 WL 2705354, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2022) (awarding fee of one-third of \$56 million settlement fund, finding “fee equal to one-third of a settlement fund is routinely approved in this Circuit”).

Lead Counsel’s fee request is reasonable, and Lead Plaintiff has ensured that the Settlement Class is fully apprised of the terms of the proposed award of attorneys’ fees, including the timing of such payments, and to date no objections have been filed. Accordingly, this factor supports final approval of the Settlement.

f. The Parties Have No Other Agreements Besides Opt-Outs

Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iv) requires the consideration of any agreement required to be disclosed under Rule 23(e)(3). As previously disclosed in connection with Lead Plaintiff’s motion for

³ The Stipulation provides that any attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded by the Court shall be paid to Lead Counsel when the Court executes the Judgment and an Order awarding such fees and expenses. See Stipulation, ¶6.2; see also *Pelzer v. Vassalle*, 655 F. App’x 352, 365 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding this provision does “not harm the class members in any discernible way, as the size of the settlement fund available to the class will be the same regardless of when the attorneys get paid”).

preliminary approval of the Settlement (ECF 76 at 11-12), the parties have entered into a supplemental agreement providing that, in the event that requests for exclusion from the Settlement Class exceed a certain agreed-upon threshold, Interface has the option to terminate the Settlement. As is standard in securities class actions, the Supplemental Agreement is being kept confidential in order to avoid incentivizing the formation of a group of opt-outs for the sole purpose of leveraging a larger individual settlement, to the detriment of the Settlement Class. This agreement has no bearing on the fairness of the Settlement, and as such, this factor weighs in favor of final approval. *See Christine Asia*, 2019 WL 5257534, at *15 (stating that opt-out agreements are “standard in securities class action settlements and ha[ve] no negative impact on the fairness of the Settlement”).

g. The Settlement Ensures Settlement Class Members Are Treated Equitably

Rule 23(e)(2)(D), the final factor, considers whether Settlement Class Members are treated equitably. As discussed further below in §IV, Lead Counsel developed the Plan of Allocation in consultation with its in-house damages expert to treat Settlement Class Members equitably relative to each other by: (i) taking into account the timing of their Interface common stock purchases, acquisitions, and sales; and (ii) providing that each Authorized Claimant shall receive his, her, its, or their *pro rata* share of the Net Settlement Fund based on their recognized losses. Lead Plaintiff is subject to the same formula for distribution of the Net Settlement Fund as every other Settlement Class Member. This factor therefore merits granting final approval of the Settlement.

Based on the foregoing, Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel respectfully submit that each of the Rule 23(e)(2) factors support granting final approval of the Settlement.

2. The Settlement Satisfies the Remaining *Grinnell* Factors

a. The Lack of Objections Supports Final Approval

The reaction of the class to the settlement “is considered perhaps ‘the most significant factor to be weighed in considering its adequacy,’” *In re Veeco Instruments Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2007 WL 4115809, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007), such that the ““absence of objections may itself be taken as evidencing the fairness of a settlement.”” *City of Providence v. Aeropostale, Inc.*, 2014 WL 1883494, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2014), *aff’d sub nom. Arbuthnot v. Pierson*, 607 F. App’x 73 (2d Cir. 2015). “If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the adequacy of the settlement.” *Wal-Mart Stores*, 396 F.3d at 118.

The deadline to submit objections is August 28, 2023; to date none have been filed to the adequacy of the Settlement and no requests for exclusion have been received. Murray Decl., ¶16. This positive reaction of the Settlement Class supports approval of the Settlement. *See Yuzary*, 2013 WL 5492998, at *6 (the “favorable response” from the settlement class “demonstrates that the [settlement class] approves of the settlement and supports final approval”); *Facebook*, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 410 (“[t]he overwhelmingly positive reaction – or absence of a negative reaction – weighs strongly in favor” of final approval).

b. Lead Plaintiff Had Sufficient Information to Make an Informed Decision Regarding the Settlement

Under the third *Grinnell* Factor, “the question is whether the parties had adequate information about their claims such that their counsel can intelligently evaluate the merits of [Lead Plaintiffs’] claims, the strengths of the defenses asserted by defendants, and the value of [Lead Plaintiff’s] causes of action for purposes of settlement.” *In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. SEC. Derivative, & ERISA Litig.*, 909 F. Supp. 2d 259, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); *Martignago v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.*, 2013 WL 12316358, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2013) (“The pertinent question is ‘whether

counsel had an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case before negotiating.”). Even though the parties here had started document discovery, “[t]o satisfy this factor, parties need not have even engaged in formal or extensive discovery.” *In re Hi-Crush Partners L.P. Sec. Litig.*, 2014 WL 7323417, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2014) (noting that in cases brought under the PSLRA, discovery cannot commence until the motion to dismiss is denied); *see also Glob. Crossing*, 225 F.R.D. at 458 (“Formal discovery is not a prerequisite; the question is whether the parties had adequate information about their claims.”).

Unquestionably, Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel had sufficient information to assess the adequacy of the Settlement. As detailed in the Rosenfeld Decl., Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel negotiated the Settlement only after conducting an extensive factual investigation, opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, reviewing documents produced by Defendants in discovery, and consulting with experts. Lead Plaintiff also participated in hard-fought settlement discussions with Defendants, overseen by an experienced and nationally renowned mediator, which ultimately resulted in the Settlement. During the mediation sessions, Defendants’ Counsel pressed the arguments raised in their motion to dismiss, in addition to further arguments they intended to make if the case were to progress. This case did not settle until several months after the initial mediation, as litigation proceeded.

Thus, by the time of the Settlement, Lead Plaintiff was well-versed in the strengths and weaknesses of the case. This factor weighs in favor of final approval.

c. Maintaining Class-Action Status Through Trial Presents a Substantial Risk

Although the Court had not yet ruled upon Lead Plaintiff’s class certification motion, Defendants were certain to have opposed it, raising the risk that the case could be lost had the Court declined to certify the class. Even if the Court certified the class for the entirety of the alleged class

period, Defendants may have later moved to decertify it or seek to shorten the Class Period. *See Christine Asia*, 2019 WL 5257534, at *13 (stating that this risk weighed in favor of final approval because “a class certification order may be altered or amended any time before a decision on the merits”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (authorizing a court to decertify a class at any time). “The risk of maintaining class status throughout trial . . . weighs in favor of final approval.” *McMahon*, 2010 WL 2399328, at *5.

d. Defendants’ Ability to Withstand a Greater Judgment

This factor is not dispositive when all other factors favor approval. Even if Defendants could have withstood a greater judgment, a “defendant’s ability to withstand a greater judgment, standing alone, does not suggest that the settlement is unfair.” *Castagna v. Madison Square Garden, L.P.*, 2011 WL 2208614, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2011); *see also Aeropostale*, 2014 WL 1883494, at *9 (courts “generally do not find the ability of a defendant to withstand a greater judgment to be an impediment to settlement when the other factors favor the settlement”). A “defendant is not required to ‘empty its coffers’ before a settlement can be found adequate.” *In re Sony SXRDRear Projection Television Class Action Litig.*, 2008 WL 1956267, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2008). Here, even if Interface could satisfy a larger judgment, all other factors favor final approval.

e. The Settlement Amount Is Reasonable in View of the Best Possible Recovery and the Risks of Litigation

The adequacy of the amount offered in a settlement must be judged “not in comparison with the possible recovery in the best of all possible worlds, but rather in light of the strengths and weaknesses of [Lead Plaintiff’s] case.” *In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 597 F. Supp. 740, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), *aff’d*, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). A court need only determine whether the settlement falls within a “range of reasonableness” that “recognizes the uncertainties of law and fact” in the case and “the concomitant risks and costs necessarily inherent in taking any litigation to

completion.” *Newman v. Stein*, 464 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1972); *see also Glob. Crossing*, 225 F.R.D. at 461 (“the certainty of [a] settlement amount has to be judged in [the] context of the legal and practical obstacles to obtaining a large recovery”).

Here, “[b]ecause [Lead Plaintiff] face[s] serious challenges to establishing liability, consideration of [Lead Plaintiff’s] best possible recovery must be accompanied by the risk of non-recovery.” *Facebook*, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 414; *see also Bear Stearns*, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 270 (stating this *Grinnell* Factor is “a function of both (1) the size of the amount relative to the best possible recovery; and (2) the likelihood of non-recovery”). The Settlement represents a recovery of between 18% and 37% of reasonably recoverable damages, an amount that far exceeds median recoveries in cases of this size. *See* Laarni T. Bulan & Laura E. Simmons, *Securities Class Action Settlements: 2022 Review and Analysis* at 7, Fig. 6 (Cornerstone Research 2023) (attached hereto as Ex. A) (median settlement as a percentage of “simplified tiered damages” in cases alleging only \$10b claims between 2013-2022 was 4.5%).⁴

Moreover, the \$7.5 million Settlement Amount “was agreed upon only after careful consideration, both by competent Lead Counsel and by [a neutral mediator]” – all of whom concluded the Settlement represented a very good recovery for the Settlement Class in light of the substantial litigation risks Lead Plaintiff faced. *See Facebook*, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 414; *see also id.* (finding that even if the settlement “amounts to one-tenth – or less – of Lead Plaintiff’s potential recovery,” such a recovery is within “the range of reasonableness” where “the risk[s] of a zero – or minimal – recovery scenario are real”). This factor weighs in favor of final approval.

⁴ Not surprisingly, Defendants contended that damages were much less, if not zero, due to the absence of any liability and loss causation.

IV. THE PLAN OF ALLOCATION IS FAIR AND ADEQUATE

The standard for approval of the Plan of Allocation is the same as the standard for approving the Settlement as a whole: namely, “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” *Signet*, 2020 WL 4196468, at *13. “‘When formulated by competent and experienced class counsel,’ a plan for allocation of net settlement proceeds ‘need have only a reasonable, rational basis.’” *Advanced Battery*, 298 F.R.D. at 180; *see also Christine Asia*, 2019 WL 5257534, at *15-*16. A plan of allocation that reimburses class members based on the relative strength and value of their claims is reasonable. *IMAX*, 283 F.R.D. at 192. However, a plan of allocation does not need to be tailored to fit each and every class member with “mathematical precision.” *In re PaineWebber Ltd. P’ships Litig.*, 171 F.R.D. 104, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), *aff’d*, 117 F.3d 721 (2d Cir. 1997).

Here, as set forth in the Notice, the Plan was prepared with the assistance of Lead Counsel’s in-house damages expert and has a rational basis, as it is based on the same methodology underlying Lead Plaintiff’s measure of damages: the amount of artificial inflation in the price of Interface common stock during the Class Period. *See Facebook*, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 414 (plan of allocation was fair where it was “prepared by experienced counsel along with a damages expert – both indicia of reasonableness”). This is a fair method to apportion the Net Settlement Fund among Authorized Claimants, as it is based on, and consistent with, the claims alleged.

The Net Settlement Fund will be distributed to Authorized Claimants who timely submit valid Claim Forms that are approved for payment from the Net Settlement Fund under the Plan. The Plan treats all Settlement Class Members equitably, as everyone who submits a valid and timely Claim Form, and does not otherwise exclude himself, herself, itself, or themselves from the Settlement Class, will receive a *pro rata* share of the Net Settlement Fund in the proportion that the Authorized Claimant’s claim bears to the total of the claims of all Authorized Claimants, so long as

such Authorized Claimant's payment amount is \$10.00 or more. *See id.*; *see also* Murray Decl., Ex. A (Notice) at 8-11.

No objections to the Plan of Allocation have been filed.

Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel believe that the Plan is fair and reasonable. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should approve the proposed Plan.

V. THE COURT SHOULD FINALLY CERTIFY THE SETTLEMENT CLASS FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTUATING THE SETTLEMENT

In its motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement, Lead Plaintiff requested that the Court certify the Settlement Class for settlement purposes so that notice of the Settlement, the Settlement Hearing, and the rights of Settlement Class Members to object to the Settlement, request exclusion from the Settlement Class, or submit Claim Forms, could be issued. *See* ECF 76 at 18-20. In the Preliminary Approval Order, the Court addressed the requirements for class certification as set forth in Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court found that Lead Plaintiff had met the requirements for certification of the Settlement Class for purposes of settlement. ECF 80 at ¶¶2-3. In addition, the Court preliminarily certified Lead Plaintiff as Class Representative and Lead Counsel as Class Counsel. *Id.*, ¶4.

Nothing has changed since the Court's entry of the Preliminary Approval Order to alter the propriety of the Court's preliminary certification of the Settlement Class for settlement purposes. Thus, for all of the reasons stated in Lead Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval (incorporated herein by reference), Lead Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court affirm its preliminary certification and finally certify the Settlement Class for purposes of carrying out the Settlement pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3), and appoint Lead Plaintiff as Class Representative and Lead Counsel as Class Counsel.

VI. NOTICE TO THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23 AND DUE PROCESS

Rule 23 requires that notice of a settlement be “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B), and that it be directed to class members in a “reasonable manner.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). Notice of a settlement satisfies Rule 23(e) and due process where it fairly apprises “members of the class of the terms of the proposed settlement and of the options that are open to them in connection with the proceedings.” *Wal-Mart Stores*, 396 F.3d at 114; *Vargas v. Cap. One Fin. Advisors*, 559 F. App’x 22, 26-27 (2d Cir. 2014). Notice is adequate “if the average person understands the terms of the proposed settlement and the options provided to class members thereunder.” *In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Rsch. Sec. Litig.*, 249 F.R.D. 124, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing *Wal-Mart Stores*, 396 F.3d at 114).

The Notice and the method used to disseminate the Notice to potential Settlement Class Members satisfy these standards. The Court-approved Notice and Claim Form (the “Notice Packet”) amply inform Settlement Class Members of, among other things: (i) the pendency of the Action; (ii) the nature of the Action and the Settlement Class’s claims; (iii) the essential terms of the Settlement; (iv) the proposed Plan; (v) Settlement Class Members’ rights to request exclusion from the Settlement Class or object to the Settlement, the Plan, or the requested attorneys’ fees or expenses; (vi) the binding effect of a judgment on Settlement Class Members; and (vii) information regarding Lead Counsel’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses. The Notice also provides specific information regarding the date, time, and place of the Settlement Hearing, and sets forth the procedures and deadlines for: (i) submitting a Claim Form; (ii) requesting exclusion from the Settlement Class; and (iii) objecting to any aspect of the Settlement, including the proposed Plan and the request for attorneys’ fees and expenses.

The Notice also contains all the information required by the PSLRA, including: (i) a statement of the amount to be distributed, determined in the aggregate and on an average-per-share basis; (ii) a statement of the potential outcome of the case; (iii) a statement indicating the attorneys' fees and expenses sought; (iv) identification and contact information of counsel; and (v) a brief statement explaining the reasons why the parties are proposing the Settlement.

In accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order, Gilardi & Co. LLC ("Gilardi"), the Court-approved Claims Administrator, commenced the mailing of the Notice Packet by First-Class Mail to potential Settlement Class Members, brokers, and nominees on June 15, 2023. As of August 10, 2023, over 30,700 copies of the Notice Packet have been mailed. Murray Decl., ¶11. Gilardi also published the Summary Notice in *The Wall Street Journal* and transmitted it over *Business Wire*. *Id.*, ¶12, Ex. C. Additionally, Gilardi posted the Notice Packet, as well as other important documents, on the website established and maintained for the Settlement. *Id.*, ¶14.

The combination of individual First-Class Mail to all potential Settlement Class Members who could be identified with reasonable effort, supplemented by mailed notice to brokers and nominees and publication of the Summary Notice in a relevant, widely-circulated publication and internet newswire, was "the best notice . . . practicable under the circumstances." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); *see also Padro v. Astrue*, 2013 WL 5719076, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2013) ("Notice need not be perfect, but need be only the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and each and every class member need not receive actual notice, so long as class counsel acted reasonably in choosing the means likely to inform potential class members.""). Indeed, this method of providing notice has been routinely approved for use in securities class actions and other similar class actions. *E.g., Rodriguez*, 2023 WL 2184496, at *10, *25 (finding that direct First-Class Mail combined with print and Internet-based publication of settlement documents was "the best notice practicable under

the circumstances”); *Dornberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 203 F.R.D. 118, 123-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).

VII. CONCLUSION

The \$7.5 million Settlement obtained by Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel represents an excellent recovery for the Settlement Class, particularly in light of the significant litigation risks Lead Plaintiff faced, including the very real risk of the Settlement Class receiving no recovery at all. For the foregoing reasons, Lead Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the proposed Settlement and Plan as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

DATED: August 14, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
& DOWD LLP
SAMUEL H. RUDMAN
DAVID A. ROSENFELD
NATALIE C. BONO

s/ David A. Rosenfeld

DAVID A. ROSENFELD

58 South Service Road, Suite 200
Melville, NY 11747
Telephone: 631/367-7100
631/367-1173 (fax)
srudman@rgrdlaw.com
drosefeld@rgrdlaw.com
nbono@rgrdlaw.com

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
& DOWD LLP
ELLEN GUSIKOFF STEWART
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
San Diego, CA 92101-8498
Telephone: 619/231-1058
619/231-7423 (fax)
elleng@rgrdlaw.com

Lead Counsel for Lead Plaintiff

EXHIBIT A



CORNERSTONE RESEARCH

Economic and Financial Consulting and Expert Testimony

Securities Class Action Settlements

2022 Review and Analysis

Table of Contents

2022 Highlights	1
Author Commentary	2
Total Settlement Dollars	3
Settlement Size	4
Type of Claim	5
Rule 10b-5 Claims and “Simplified Tiered Damages”	5
’33 Act Claims and “Simplified Statutory Damages”	7
Analysis of Settlement Characteristics	9
GAAP Violations	9
Derivative Actions	10
Corresponding SEC Actions	11
Institutional Investors	12
Time to Settlement and Case Complexity	13
Case Stage at the Time of Settlement	14
Cornerstone Research’s Settlement Analysis	15
Research Sample	16
Data Sources	16
Endnotes	17
Appendices	18
About the Authors	23

Figures and Appendices

Figure 1: Settlement Statistics	1
Figure 2: Total Settlement Dollars	3
Figure 3: Distribution of Settlements	4
Figure 4: Median and Average “Simplified Tiered Damages” in Rule 10b-5 Cases	5
Figure 5: Median Settlement as a Percentage of “Simplified Tiered Damages” by Damages Ranges in Rule 10b-5 Cases	6
Figure 6: Settlements by Nature of Claims	7
Figure 7: Median Settlement as a Percentage of “Simplified Statutory Damages” by Damages Ranges in ‘33 Act Claim Cases	8
Figure 8: Median Settlement as a Percentage of “Simplified Tiered Damages” and Allegations of GAAP Violations	9
Figure 9: Frequency of Derivative Actions	10
Figure 10: Frequency of SEC Actions	11
Figure 11: Median Settlement Amounts and Institutional Investors	12
Figure 12: Median Settlement by Duration from Filing Date to Settlement Hearing Date	13
Figure 13: Median Settlement Dollars and Resolution Stage at Time of Settlement	14
Appendix 1: Settlement Percentiles	18
Appendix 2: Settlements by Select Industry Sectors	18
Appendix 3: Settlements by Federal Circuit Court	19
Appendix 4: Mega Settlements	19
Appendix 5: Median and Average Settlements as a Percentage of “Simplified Tiered Damages”	20
Appendix 6: Median and Average Settlements as a Percentage of “Simplified Statutory Damages”	20
Appendix 7: Median and Average Maximum Dollar Loss (MDL)	21
Appendix 8: Median and Average Disclosure Dollar Loss (DDL)	21
Appendix 9: Median Docket Entries by “Simplified Tiered Damages” Range	22

Analyses in this report are based on 2,116 securities class actions filed after passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Reform Act) and settled from 1996 through year-end 2022. See page 16 for a detailed description of the research sample. For purposes of this report and related research, a settlement refers to a negotiated agreement between the parties to a securities class action that is publicly announced to potential class members by means of a settlement notice.

2022 Highlights

In 2022, the number of settled cases reached its highest level in 15 years, increasing 21% relative to 2021. The median settlement amount, median “simplified tiered damages,” and median total assets of the defendant issuer also rose dramatically.¹

- In 2022, the number of securities class action settlements increased to 105 with a total settlement value of over \$3.8 billion, compared to 87 settlements in 2021 with a total value of \$1.9 billion. (page 3)
- The median settlement amount of \$13.0 million represents an increase of 46% from 2021, while the average settlement amount (\$36.2 million) increased by 63%. (page 4)
- The \$3.8 billion total settlement dollars were 97% higher than the prior year. (page 3)
- There were eight mega settlements (equal to or greater than \$100 million), ranging from \$100 million to \$809.5 million. (page 3)
- The increase in the proportion of “midsize” settlement amounts (\$10 million to \$50 million) was accompanied by a decrease in the proportion of cases that settled for less than \$10 million. (page 4)
- Median “simplified tiered damages” increased more than 125% and reached a record high.² (page 5)
- Median “disclosure dollar losses”³ grew by more than 160%, also reaching an all-time high. (page 5)
- Compared to defendant firms involved in cases that settled in 2021, defendant firms involved in 2022 settlements were 97% larger, as measured by median total assets. (page 5)
- The historically low rate of settled cases involving a corresponding action by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) observed in 2021 persisted in 2022, remaining below 9%. (page 11)

Figure 1: Settlement Statistics

(Dollars in millions)

	2017–2021	2021	2022
Number of Settlements	395	87	105
Total Amount	\$16,714.3	\$1,932.4	\$3,805.5
Minimum	\$0.3	\$0.7	\$0.7
Median	\$10.2	\$8.9	\$13.0
Average	\$42.3	\$22.2	\$36.2
Maximum	\$3,496.8	\$202.5	\$809.5

Note: Settlement dollars are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented.

Author Commentary

Findings

The year 2022 was a record year for settlement activity. The number of securities class action settlements in 2022 increased sharply from 2021 and reached levels not observed since 2007. This sharp increase was accompanied by dramatic growth in case settlement amounts, “simplified tiered damages” (our rough proxy for potential shareholder losses), and the size of issuer defendant firms.

The historically high number of settlements in 2022 can be explained by the elevated number of case filings in 2018–2020, when over 70% of these settled cases were filed.

The median settlement amount is the highest since 2018. This was likely driven by the record-high level of “simplified tiered damages,” an estimate of potential shareholder losses that our research finds is the single most important factor in explaining settlement amounts.

The all-time-high median “simplified tiered damages” reflects a number of factors such as larger issuer defendants (measured by the company’s total assets) and larger disclosure dollar losses (a measure of the change in the issuer defendant’s market capitalization following the class-ending alleged corrective disclosure). Institutional investors are more likely to serve as lead plaintiffs in larger cases, i.e., cases with relatively high “simplified tiered damages.” Consistent with this observation, institutional investor involvement as lead plaintiffs for 2022 settled cases was higher than the prior year and the 2017–2021 average. Larger cases also tend to take longer to settle, and accordingly, we observe an increase in the median time to settlement in 2022 relative to prior years.

2022 was an interesting year as settlement activity reached historically high levels across several dimensions, including the number and size of settlements, and a record-high for our proxy for potential shareholder losses.

*Dr. Laarni T. Bulan
Principal, Cornerstone Research*

In contrast to the historic highs, settlements in relation to our proxy for potential shareholder losses declined sharply. In particular, both the median and average settlement as a percentage of “simplified tiered damages” in 2022 fell to their lowest levels among post–Reform Act years. These low levels are consistent with a low presence in 2022 of factors often associated with higher settlement amounts, such as the presence of an SEC action, criminal charges, or accounting irregularities.⁴

Securities class action settlements in 2022 involved substantially larger cases with larger issuer defendant firms. Overall, these cases took longer to resolve and reached more advanced litigation stages before settlement than in prior years.

*Dr. Laura E. Simmons
Senior Advisor, Cornerstone Research*

Looking Ahead

In light of the reduced level in the number of securities class action case filings in 2021–2022, we may begin to see a slowdown or flattening out in settlement activity in the upcoming years,⁵ absent a decrease in dismissal rates.

Given that SEC enforcement actions have tended to increase subsequent to when a new SEC Chair is sworn in (which last occurred in 2021), we may also begin to see a reversal in the frequency of corresponding SEC actions among settled cases in the near term. For additional details, see Cornerstone Research’s *SEC Enforcement Activity: Public Company and Subsidiaries—FY 2022 Update*.

As discussed in Cornerstone Research’s *Securities Class Action Filings—2022 Year in Review*, certain issues have emerged as focus areas in securities class actions. In particular, 26% of all core federal filings in 2020–2022 were related to special purpose acquisition company (SPAC), COVID-19, or cryptocurrency matters. While very few of these types of cases have settled to date, we expect increased settlement activity for these cases in the future.

—Laarni T. Bulan and Laura E. Simmons

Total Settlement Dollars

As has been observed in prior years, the presence or absence of just a few very large settlements can have a substantial effect on total settlement dollars for a given year.


- The number of settlements in 2022 (105 cases) continued the upward trend since 2019 and represented a 38% increase from the prior nine-year average (76 cases).
- An increase in the number of mega settlements (i.e., settlements equal to or greater than \$100 million) contributed to total settlement dollars nearly doubling in 2022 compared to the prior year.

- There were eight mega settlements in 2022, ranging from \$100 million to \$809.5 million. Eight such settlements is the highest number since 2016.
- A decline in the proportion of very small settlements further contributed to the growth in total settlement dollars. Only 23% of settlements in 2022 were for less than \$5 million, compared to 33% of cases settled in the prior nine years.

The number of settlements in 2022 was the highest number since 2007.

Figure 2: Total Settlement Dollars 2013–2022

(Dollars in billions)



Note: Settlement dollars are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented. “N” refers to the number of cases.

Settlement Size


- The median settlement amount in 2022 was \$13.0 million, a 46% increase from 2021 and a 34% increase from the prior nine-year median. Median values provide the midpoint in a series of observations and are less affected than averages by outlier data.
- The average settlement amount in 2022 was \$36.2 million, a 63% increase from 2021. (See [Appendix 1](#) for an analysis of settlements by percentiles.)
- In 2022, 42% of cases settled for between \$10 million and \$50 million, compared to only 30% in 2021 and 34% in 2013–2021.

The median settlement amount in 2022 was the highest since 2018.

- The increase in the proportion of these “midsize” settlement amounts (\$10 million to \$50 million) was accompanied by a decrease in the proportion of cases that settled for less than \$10 million—43% in 2022 compared to 56% in 2021 and 51% in the prior nine years.

Figure 3: Distribution of Settlements 2013–2022

(Dollars in millions)



Note: Settlement dollars are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented.

Type of Claim

Rule 10b-5 Claims and “Simplified Tiered Damages”

“Simplified tiered damages” uses simplifying assumptions to estimate per-share damages and trading behavior for cases involving Rule 10b-5 claims. It provides a measure of potential shareholder losses that allows for consistency across a large volume of cases, thus enabling the identification and analysis of potential trends.⁶

Cornerstone Research’s analysis finds this measure to be the most important factor in estimating settlement amounts.⁷ However, this measure is not intended to represent actual economic losses borne by shareholders. Determining any such losses for a given case requires more in-depth economic analysis.


- Similar to settlement amounts, the median “simplified tiered damages” in 2022 increased 125% compared to 2021 and was over 100% higher than the median of settled cases for the prior nine years.

- In 2022, nearly half of settlements with Rule 10b-5 claims involved “simplified tiered damages” over \$500 million, an all-time high.
- Higher “simplified tiered damages” are typically associated with larger issuer defendants. Consistent with this, the median total assets of issuer defendants in 2022 settled cases was 97% higher than the median total assets for 2021 settled cases.
- Higher “simplified tiered damages” are also generally associated with larger disclosure dollar losses. In 2022, the median DDL grew by more than 160% compared to 2021, reaching an all-time high.

Median “simplified tiered damages” reached an all-time high in 2022.

Figure 4: Median and Average “Simplified Tiered Damages” in Rule 10b-5 Cases 2013–2022

(Dollars in millions)




Note: “Simplified tiered damages” are adjusted for inflation based on class period end dates for common stock only; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented. Damages are estimated for cases alleging a claim under Rule 10b-5 (whether alone or in addition to other claims).

- Only 4% of settlements in 2022 had “simplified tiered damages” less than \$25 million, the lowest observed to date.
- Cases with smaller “simplified tiered damages” are more likely to be associated with issuers that had been delisted from a major exchange and/or declared bankruptcy prior to settlement. In 2022, the percentage of such issuers for settled cases was at an all-time low (11%).
- The 2022 median and average settlement as a percentage of “simplified tiered damages” of 3.6% and 5.4%, respectively, are all-time lows. (See [Appendix 5](#) for additional information on median and average settlements as a percentage of “simplified tiered damages.”)

Figure 5: Median Settlement as a Percentage of “Simplified Tiered Damages” by Damages Ranges in Rule 10b-5 Cases 2013–2022

(Dollars in millions)



Note: Damages are estimated for cases alleging a claim under Rule 10b-5 (whether alone or in addition to other claims).

'33 Act Claims and "Simplified Statutory Damages"

For Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) claim cases—those involving only Section 11 and/or Section 12(a)(2) claims—potential shareholder losses are estimated using a model in which the statutory loss is the difference between the statutory purchase price and the statutory sales price, referred to here as "simplified statutory damages." Only the offered shares are assumed to be eligible for damages.⁸

- In 2022, there were nine settlements for cases with only '33 Act claims, in line with the average from 2017 to 2020 and well below the historically high number of 16 settlements observed in 2021.

- The median settlement as a percentage of simplified statutory damages in 2022 and 2021 were 4.7% and 4.4%, respectively—the lowest levels since 2002. (See *Appendix 6 for additional information on median and average settlements as a percentage of "simplified statutory damages."*)
- The average settlement amount for cases with only '33 Act claims was \$7.3 million in 2022, compared to \$14.9 million during 2013-2021.

In 2022, the median settlement amount for cases with only '33 Act claims was \$7.0 million, the lowest since 2013.

Figure 6: Settlements by Nature of Claims
 2013–2022

(Dollars in millions)

	Number of Settlements	Median Settlement	Median "Simplified Statutory Damages"	Median Settlement as a Percentage of "Simplified Statutory Damages"
Section 11 and/or Section 12(a)(2) Only	82	\$9.2	\$145.2	8.7%

	Number of Settlements	Median Settlement	Median "Simplified Tiered Damages"	Median Settlement as a Percentage of "Simplified Tiered Damages"
Both Rule 10b-5 and Section 11 and/or Section 12(a)(2)	123	\$15.4	\$355.7	6.3%
Rule 10b-5 Only	581	\$9.0	\$250.1	4.5%


Note: Settlement dollars and damages are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented.

- Settlements as a percentage of the simplified proxies for potential shareholder losses used in this report are typically smaller for cases that have larger estimated damages. As with cases with Rule 10b-5 claims, this finding holds for cases with only '33 Act claims.
- In the past decade, over 85% of the settled '33 Act claim cases involved an underwriter (or underwriters) as a named codefendant.
- Over 80% of '33 Act claim cases that settled in 2013–2022 involved an initial public offering (IPO).

Consistent with the lower median settlement amount among '33 Act claim cases, the median “simplified statutory damages” in 2022 declined by 61% from the median in 2021 and was the lowest since 2016.

Figure 7: Median Settlement as a Percentage of “Simplified Statutory Damages” by Damages Ranges in '33 Act Claim Cases 2013–2022

(Dollars in millions)



Jurisdictions of Settlements of '33 Act Claim Cases

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
State Court	1	0	2	4	5	4	4	7	6	6
Federal Court	7	2	2	6	3	4	5	1	10	3

Note: “N” refers to the number of cases. This analysis excludes cases alleging Rule 10b-5 claims..

Analysis of Settlement Characteristics

GAAP Violations


This analysis examines allegations of GAAP violations in settlements of securities class actions involving Rule 10b-5 claims, including two sub-categories of GAAP violations—financial statement restatements and accounting irregularities.⁹ For further details regarding settlements of accounting cases, see Cornerstone Research’s annual report on *Accounting Class Action Filings and Settlements*.¹⁰

- For the first time since 2017, the median settlement amount for cases involving GAAP allegations was larger than that for non-GAAP cases. Notably, in 2022 the median settlement amount for GAAP cases was more than double that of non-GAAP cases.
- As noted in prior years, settlements as a percentage of “simplified tiered damages” for cases involving GAAP allegations are typically higher than for non-GAAP cases. This result has continued despite a relatively low number of cases involving a financial restatement. For example, only 11% of settlements in 2022 involved a restatement of financial statements.

- Auditor codefendants were involved in only 3% of settled cases, consistent with 2021 but substantially lower than the average from 2013 to 2021.
- The infrequency of cases alleging accounting irregularities continued in 2022 at less than 2% of settled cases.

The proportion of settled cases in 2022 with Rule 10b-5 claims alleging GAAP violations remained at a historically low level.

Figure 8: Median Settlement as a Percentage of “Simplified Tiered Damages” and Allegations of GAAP Violations 2013–2022



Note: “N” refers to the number of cases. This analysis is limited to cases alleging Rule 10b-5 claims (whether alone or in addition to other claims).


Derivative Actions

- Securities class actions often involve accompanying (or parallel) derivative actions with similar claims, and such cases have historically settled for higher amounts than securities class actions without corresponding derivative matters.¹¹
- In 2022, the median settlement amount for cases with an accompanying derivative action was approximately 28% higher than for cases without (\$14.1 million versus \$11.0 million, respectively).
- For cases settled during 2018–2022, 38% of parallel derivative suits were filed in Delaware. California and New York were the next most common venues for such actions, representing 22% and 15% of such settlements, respectively.

Although the proportion of cases involving accompanying derivative actions in 2022 was higher compared to 2021, it was below the average for 2018–2021.

- It is commonly understood that most parallel derivative suits do not settle for monetary amounts (other than plaintiffs’ attorney fees). However, the likelihood of a monetary settlement among parallel derivative actions is higher when the securities class action settlement is large, as shown in Cornerstone Research’s *Parallel Derivative Action Settlement Outcomes*.¹²

Figure 9: Frequency of Derivative Actions 2013–2022




Corresponding SEC Actions

- Historically, cases with an accompanying SEC action have typically been associated with substantially higher settlement amounts.¹³ However, this pattern did not hold in 2022.
- The median settlement amount in 2022 for cases that involved a corresponding SEC action was less than 5% higher than the median for cases without such an action. In contrast, in 2021, the median settlement amount for cases with an accompanying SEC action was more than double that for cases without such an action.
- Both “simplified tiered damages” and DDL were lower in 2022 for cases with a corresponding SEC action when compared to those without, at 72% and 83% lower, respectively.
- Settled cases in 2022 with a corresponding SEC action were nearly 10% quicker to reach settlement, on average, compared to cases without such an action. In contrast, in 2021, cases with corresponding SEC actions took over 20% longer to reach a settlement than cases without corresponding SEC actions.
- The number of settled cases in 2022 involving either a corresponding SEC action or criminal charge remained below 13%, compared to an average of 24% for the years 2013–2021.

Settled cases involving SEC actions in 2022 were considerably smaller than cases without accompanying SEC actions.

Figure 10: Frequency of SEC Actions
 2013–2022



Institutional Investors

As discussed in prior reports, increasing institutional participation as lead plaintiffs in securities litigation was a focus of the Reform Act.¹⁴ Indeed, in years following passage of the Reform Act, institutional investor involvement as lead plaintiffs did increase, particularly in larger cases, that is, cases with higher “simplified tiered damages.”


- In 2022, for cases involving an institutional investor as lead plaintiff, median “simplified tiered damages” and median total assets were five times and eight times higher, respectively, than the median values for cases without an institutional investor as a lead plaintiff.
- Since passage of the Reform Act, public pension plans have been the most frequent type of institutional lead plaintiff.

- In 2022, a public pension plan served as lead plaintiff in two-thirds of cases with an institutional lead plaintiff. Moreover, in six of the seven mega settlement cases in 2022 involving an institutional lead plaintiff, the institutional investor was a public pension plan.
- Institutional participation as lead plaintiff continues to be associated with particular plaintiff counsel. For example, an institutional investor served as a lead plaintiff in 2022 in over 85% of settled cases in which Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP and/or Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP served as lead plaintiff counsel. In contrast, institutional investors served as lead plaintiffs in 21% of cases in which The Rosen Law Firm, Pomerantz LLP, or Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP served as lead plaintiff counsel.

Of the eight mega settlement cases in 2022, seven included an institutional lead plaintiff.

Figure 11: Median Settlement Amounts and Institutional Investors 2013–2022

(Dollars in millions)



Note: Settlement dollars are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented.

Time to Settlement and Case Complexity


- Overall, the median time from filing to settlement hearing date in 2022 was longer—3.2 years for 2022 settlements, compared to 2.9 years for 2013–2021 settlements.
- Cases involving an institutional lead plaintiff continued to take longer to settle. In particular, settlements in 2022 with institutional lead plaintiffs took 33% longer to settle than cases not involving an institutional lead plaintiff.

Only 42% of cases in 2022 reached a settlement hearing date within three years of filing, the lowest percentage in the prior nine years.

- Larger cases (as measured by higher “simplified tiered damages”) often take longer to resolve. Consistent with this, in 2022, the median time to settlement for cases that settled for at least \$100 million was over 5.5 years—an all-time high for such cases.

Figure 12: Median Settlement by Duration from Filing Date to Settlement Hearing Date 2013–2022

(Dollars in millions)



Note: Settlement dollars are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented. “N” refers to the number of cases.


Case Stage at the Time of Settlement

In collaboration with Stanford Securities Litigation Analytics (SSLA),¹⁵ this report analyzes settlements in relation to the stage in the litigation process at the time of settlement.

- Cases settling at later stages continue to be larger in terms of total assets and “simplified tiered damages.”
- In particular, the median issuer defendant total assets for 2022 cases that settled after the ruling on a motion for class certification was over four times the median for cases that settled prior to such a motion being ruled on.
- In 2022, cases where a motion for class certification was filed were nearly three times as likely to have either Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP and/or Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP as lead plaintiff counsel than The Rosen Law Firm, Pomerantz LLP, or Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.
- Cases settling at later stages often included an institutional investor lead plaintiff. For example, in 2022, an institutional investor served as lead plaintiff 69% of the time for cases that settled after the filing of a motion for class certification (slightly higher than the percentage over the prior four years), compared to 44% for cases that settled prior to the filing of a motion for class certification (38% in the prior four years)
- Overall, compared to settlements in 2021, a larger proportion of cases in 2022 did not reach settlement until after a motion for class certification was filed. In addition, 14% of 2022 settled cases were resolved after a summary judgment motion, compared to less than 9% for 2018–2021 settlements.

Figure 13: Median Settlement Dollars and Resolution Stage at Time of Settlement 2018–2022

(Dollars in millions)



Note: Settlement dollars are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented. “N” refers to the number of cases. MTD refers to “motion to dismiss,” CC refers to “class certification,” and MSJ refers to “motion for summary judgment.” This analysis is limited to cases alleging Rule 10b-5 claims (whether alone or in addition to other claims).

Cornerstone Research's Settlement Analysis

This research applies regression analysis to examine the relations between settlement outcomes and certain securities case characteristics. Regression analysis is employed to better understand the factors that are important for estimating what cases might settle for, given the characteristics of a particular securities class action.

Determinants of Settlement Outcomes

Based on the research sample of cases that settled from January 2006 through December 2022, important determinants of settlement amounts include the following:

- “Simplified tiered damages”
- Maximum Dollar Loss (MDL)—the dollar-value change in the defendant firm’s market capitalization from its class period peak to the trading day immediately following the end of the class period.
- Most recently reported total assets of the issuer defendant firm
- Number of entries on the lead case docket
- Whether there were accounting allegations
- Whether there was a corresponding SEC action against the issuer, other defendants, or related parties
- Whether there were criminal charges against the issuer, other defendants, or related parties with similar allegations to those included in the underlying class action complaint
- Whether there was an accompanying derivative action

- Whether Section 11 and/or Section 12(a) claims were alleged in addition to Rule 10b-5 claims
- Whether the issuer defendant was distressed
- Whether an institution was a lead plaintiff
- Whether securities other than common stock/ADR/ADS, were included in the alleged class

Cornerstone Research analyses show that settlements were higher when “simplified tiered damages,” MDL, issuer defendant asset size, or the number of docket entries was larger, or when Section 11 and/or Section 12(a) claims were alleged in addition to Rule 10b-5 claims.

Settlements were also higher in cases involving accounting allegations, a corresponding SEC action, criminal charges, an accompanying derivative action, an institution involved as lead plaintiff, or securities in addition to common stock included in the alleged class.

Settlements were lower if the issuer was distressed.

More than 75% of the variation in settlement amounts can be explained by the factors discussed above.

Research Sample

- The database compiled for this report is limited to cases alleging Rule 10b-5, Section 11, and/or Section 12(a)(2) claims brought by purchasers of a corporation's common stock. The sample contains only cases alleging fraudulent inflation in the price of a corporation's common stock.
- Cases with alleged classes of only bondholders, preferred stockholders, etc., cases alleging fraudulent depression in price, and mergers and acquisitions cases are excluded. These criteria are imposed to ensure data availability and to provide a relatively homogeneous set of cases in terms of the nature of the allegations.
- The current sample includes 2,116 securities class actions filed after passage of the Reform Act (1995) and settled from 1996 through 2022. These settlements are identified based on a review of case activity collected by Securities Class Action Services LLC (SCAS).¹⁶
- The designated settlement year, for purposes of this report, corresponds to the year in which the hearing to approve the settlement was held.¹⁷ Cases involving multiple settlements are reflected in the year of the most recent partial settlement, provided certain conditions are met.¹⁸

Data Sources

In addition to SCAS, data sources include Dow Jones Factiva, Bloomberg, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Standard & Poor's Compustat, Refinitiv Eikon, court filings and dockets, SEC registrant filings, SEC litigation releases and administrative proceedings, LexisNexis, Stanford Securities Litigation Analytics (SSLA), Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC), and public press.

Endnotes

- ¹ Reported dollar figures and corresponding comparisons are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are analyzed.
- ² “Simplified tiered damages” are calculated for cases that settled in 2006 or later, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 landmark decision in *Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo*, 544 U.S. 336. “Simplified tiered damages” is based on the stock-price drops on alleged corrective disclosure dates as described in the settlement plan of allocation.
- ³ Disclosure Dollar Loss or DDL is the dollar-value change in the defendant firm’s market capitalization between the end of the class period and the trading day immediately following the end of the class period.
- ⁴ Accounting irregularities reflect those cases in which the defendant has reported the occurrence of accounting irregularities (intentional misstatements or omissions) in its financial statements.
- ⁵ *Securities Class Action Filings—2022 Year in Review*, Cornerstone Research (2023).
- ⁶ The “simplified tiered damages” approach used for purposes of this settlement research does not examine the mix of information associated with the specific dates listed in the plan of allocation, but simply applies the stock price movements on those dates to an estimate of the “true value” of the stock during the alleged class period (or “value line”). This proxy for damages utilizes an estimate of the number of shares damaged based on reported trading volume and the number of shares outstanding. Specifically, reported trading volume is adjusted using volume reduction assumptions based on the exchange on which the issuer defendant’s common stock is listed. No adjustments are made to the underlying float for institutional holdings, insider trades, or short-selling activity during the alleged class period. Because of these and other simplifying assumptions, the damages measures used in settlement outcome modeling may differ substantially from damages estimates developed in conjunction with case-specific economic analysis.
- ⁷ Laarni T. Bulan, Ellen M. Ryan, and Laura E. Simmons, *Estimating Damages in Settlement Outcome Modeling*, Cornerstone Research (2017).
- ⁸ The statutory purchase price is the lesser of the security offering price or the security purchase price. Prior to the first complaint filing date, the statutory sales price is the price at which the security was sold. After the first complaint filing date, the statutory sales price is the greater of the security sales price or the security price on the first complaint filing date. Similar to “simplified tiered damages,” the estimation of “simplified statutory damages” makes no adjustments to the underlying float for institutional holdings, insider trades, or short-selling activity.
- ⁹ The two sub-categories of accounting issues analyzed in Figure 8 of this report are (1) restatements—cases involving a restatement (or announcement of a restatement) of financial statements; and (2) accounting irregularities.
- ¹⁰ *Accounting Class Action Filings and Settlements—2022 Review and Analysis*, Cornerstone Research (2023), forthcoming in spring 2023.
- ¹¹ To be considered an accompanying or parallel derivative action, the derivative action must have underlying allegations that are similar or related to the underlying allegations of the securities class action and either be active or settling at the same time as the securities class action.
- ¹² *Parallel Derivative Action Settlement Outcomes*, Cornerstone Research (2022).
- ¹³ As noted previously, it could be that the merits in such cases are stronger, or simply that the presence of a corresponding SEC action provides plaintiffs with increased leverage when negotiating a settlement. For purposes of this research, an SEC action is evidenced by the presence of a litigation release or an administrative proceeding posted on www.sec.gov involving the issuer defendant or other named defendants with allegations similar to those in the underlying class action complaint.
- ¹⁴ See, for example, *Securities Class Action Settlements—2006 Review and Analysis*, Cornerstone Research (2007) and Michael A. Perino, “Have Institutional Fiduciaries Improved Securities Class Actions? A Review of the Empirical Literature on the PSLRA’s Lead Plaintiff Provision,” St. John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-0021 (2013).
- ¹⁵ Stanford Securities Litigation Analytics (SSLA) tracks and collects data on private shareholder securities litigation and public enforcements brought by the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice. The SSLA dataset includes all traditional class actions, SEC actions, and DOJ criminal actions filed since 2000. Available on a subscription basis at <https://sla.law.stanford.edu/>.
- ¹⁶ Available on a subscription basis. For further details see <https://www.issgovernance.com/securities-class-action-services/>.
- ¹⁷ Movements of partial settlements between years can cause differences in amounts reported for prior years from those presented in earlier reports.
- ¹⁸ This categorization is based on the timing of the settlement hearing date. If a new partial settlement equals or exceeds 50% of the then-current settlement fund amount, the entirety of the settlement amount is re-categorized to reflect the settlement hearing date of the most recent partial settlement. If a subsequent partial settlement is less than 50% of the then-current total, the partial settlement is added to the total settlement amount and the settlement hearing date is left unchanged.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Settlement Percentiles

(Dollars in millions)

Year	Average	10th	25th	Median	75th	90th
2013	\$90.8	\$2.4	\$3.8	\$8.2	\$27.9	\$103.6
2014	\$22.5	\$2.1	\$3.5	\$7.4	\$16.3	\$61.8
2015	\$48.6	\$1.6	\$2.7	\$8.0	\$20.1	\$116.1
2016	\$86.1	\$2.3	\$5.1	\$10.4	\$40.2	\$178.0
2017	\$22.0	\$1.8	\$3.1	\$6.3	\$18.2	\$42.3
2018	\$75.6	\$1.8	\$4.2	\$13.1	\$28.8	\$57.3
2019	\$32.3	\$1.7	\$6.4	\$12.6	\$22.9	\$57.2
2020	\$62.3	\$1.6	\$3.6	\$11.1	\$22.9	\$60.3
2021	\$22.2	\$1.9	\$3.4	\$8.9	\$19.3	\$63.3
2022	\$36.2	\$2.0	\$5.0	\$13.0	\$33.0	\$71.8

Note: Settlement dollars are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented.

Appendix 2: Settlements by Select Industry Sectors

2013–2022

(Dollars in millions)

Industry	Number of Settlements	Median Settlement	Median “Simplified Tiered Damages”	Median Settlement as a Percentage of “Simplified Tiered Damages”
Financial	92	\$14.8	\$293.3	5.0%
Healthcare	20	\$14.2	\$189.4	6.4%
Pharmaceuticals	119	\$7.6	\$237.6	3.8%
Retail	50	\$13.2	\$294.2	4.8%
Technology	103	\$9.3	\$315.9	4.6%
Telecommunication	26	\$10.5	\$311.0	4.4%

Note: Settlement dollars and “simplified tiered damages” are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented. “Simplified tiered damages” are calculated only for cases involving Rule 10b-5 claims (whether alone or in addition to other claims).

Appendix 3: Settlements by Federal Circuit Court
 2013–2022


(Dollars in millions)

Circuit	Number of Settlements	Median Settlement	Median Settlement as a Percentage of “Simplified Tiered Damages”
First	21	\$12.4	3.0%
Second	202	\$9.0	5.0%
Third	81	\$7.5	4.9%
Fourth	26	\$22.9	3.8%
Fifth	38	\$10.7	4.9%
Sixth	32	\$13.5	7.4%
Seventh	37	\$15.5	3.6%
Eighth	14	\$46.4	5.1%
Ninth	191	\$7.6	4.6%
Tenth	17	\$10.2	5.8%
Eleventh	37	\$11.9	4.9%
DC	5	\$33.7	2.4%

Note: Settlement dollars are adjusted for inflation; 2022 dollar equivalent figures are presented. Settlements as a percentage of “simplified tiered damages” are calculated only for cases alleging Rule 10b-5 claims (whether alone or in addition to other claims).


Appendix 4: Mega Settlements
 2013–2022

- Total Mega Settlement Dollars as a Percentage of All Settlement Dollars
- Number of Mega Settlements as a Percentage of All Settlements




Note: Mega settlements are defined as total settlement funds equal to or greater than \$100 million.

Appendix 5: Median and Average Settlements as a Percentage of “Simplified Tiered Damages”
 2013–2022



Note: “Simplified tiered damages” are calculated only for cases alleging Rule 10b-5 claims (whether alone or in addition to other claims).

Appendix 6: Median and Average Settlements as a Percentage of “Simplified Statutory Damages”
 2013–2022




Note: “Simplified statutory damages” are calculated only for cases alleging Section 11 (‘33 Act) claims and no Rule 10b-5 claims.

Appendix 7: Median and Average Maximum Dollar Loss (MDL)

2013–2022

(Dollars in millions)




Note: MDL is adjusted for inflation based on class period end dates; 2022 dollar equivalents are presented. MDL is the dollar value change in the defendant firm’s market capitalization from the trading day with the highest market capitalization during the class period to the trading day immediately following the end of the class period. This analysis excludes cases alleging ‘33 Act claims only.

Appendix 8: Median and Average Disclosure Dollar Loss (DDL)

2013–2022


(Dollars in millions)



Note: DDL is adjusted for inflation based on class period end dates; 2022 dollar equivalents are presented. DDL is the dollar-value change in the defendant firm’s market capitalization between the end of the class period and the trading day immediately following the end of the class period. This analysis excludes cases alleging ‘33 Act claims only.

Appendix 9: Median Docket Entries by “Simplified Tiered Damages” Range
2013–2022

(Dollars in millions)



Note: “Simplified tiered damages” are calculated only for cases alleging Rule 10b-5 claims (whether alone or in addition to other claims).

About the Authors

Laarni T. Bulan

Ph.D., Columbia University; M.Phil., Columbia University; B.S., University of the Philippines

Laarni Bulan is a principal in Cornerstone Research's Boston office, where she specializes in finance. Her work has focused on securities and other complex litigation addressing class certification, damages, and loss causation issues, firm valuation, and corporate governance, executive compensation, and risk management issues. She has also consulted on cases related to insider trading, market manipulation and trading behavior, financial institutions and the credit crisis, derivatives, foreign exchange, and securities clearing and settlement.

Dr. Bulan has published notable academic articles in peer-reviewed journals. Her research covers topics in dividend policy, capital structure, executive compensation, corporate governance, and real options. Prior to joining Cornerstone Research, Dr. Bulan had a joint appointment at Brandeis University as an assistant professor of finance in its International Business School and in the economics department.

Laura E. Simmons

Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; M.B.A., University of Houston; B.B.A., University of Texas at Austin

Laura Simmons is a senior advisor with Cornerstone Research. She has more than 25 years of experience in economic consulting. Dr. Simmons has focused on damages and liability issues in securities class actions, as well as litigation involving the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). She has also managed cases involving financial accounting, valuation, and corporate governance issues. She has served as a testifying expert in litigation involving accounting analyses, securities case damages, ERISA matters, and research on securities lawsuits.

Dr. Simmons's research on pre- and post-Reform Act securities litigation settlements has been published in a number of reports and is frequently cited in the public press and legal journals. She has spoken at various conferences and appeared as a guest on CNBC addressing the topic of securities case settlements. She has also published in academic journals, including research focusing on the intersection of accounting and litigation. Dr. Simmons was previously an accounting faculty member at the Mason School of Business at the College of William & Mary. From 1986 to 1991, she was an accountant with Price Waterhouse.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the research efforts and significant contributions of their colleagues at Cornerstone Research in the writing and preparation of this annual update. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of Cornerstone Research.

Many publications quote, cite, or reproduce data, charts, or tables from Cornerstone Research reports. The authors request that you reference Cornerstone Research in any reprint, quotation, or citation of the charts, tables, or data reported in this study.

Please direct any questions and requests for additional information to the settlement database administrator at settlementdatabase@cornerstone.com.

Boston

617.927.3000

Chicago

312.345.7300

London

+44.20.3655.0900

Los Angeles

213.553.2500

New York

212.605.5000

San Francisco

415.229.8100

Silicon Valley

650.853.1660

Washington

202.912.8900

www.cornerstone.com

